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We propose a new, voluntary mechanism (the hybrid lottery) as a means for nancing
the provision of public goods.
We nd that, under some conditions, the mechanism can mitigate the free-riding problem
and that, for each player, the (weakly) dominant strategy is the one that in equilibrium
implements the rst best.
We also nd that the mechanism is quite robust to modications of the basic model, in-
cluding heterogeneity in incomes and preferences, di¤erent utility functions and incomplete
information.
Finally, the mechanism is self-nanced(i.e., it never runs out of money, neither on-
nor o¤-equilibrium path) and because of the use of dominant strategiesit is very easy to
solve by players. Thus, the mechanism is simple to implement in the real world by charities
and other organisations that rely on voluntary contributions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is a well known result that the voluntary, private provision of public goods
su¤ers from the free-rider problem and results in a systematic underprovision of the
public good when it is socially desirable.
This paper proposes a new mechanism namely, the hybrid lotteryto increase
voluntary contributions. It does so by the creation of a subsidy scheme in which the
average subsidy rate (ASR) is a non-linear, decreasing function of the total (gross)
contributions (TGC) of the players. Thus, if a player decides to increase her con-
tribution it decreases the subsidy enjoyed by everyone else, and for every dollar
contributed (not just the marginal one). Thus, if the elasticity of the ASR with
respect to the TGC is su¢ ciently high (at least, higher than 1), then an increase in
aggregate contributions leads to a more than proportional decrease in the subsidy
rate and consequentlyto a more than proportional increase in the level of public
goods provided. This way, the marginal private benet of contribution increases
more than the marginal cost (as compared to the standard voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM)) and the incentives to contribute increase (free-riding decreases).
Further, under some conditions, it can implement the rst best allocation. That
is, it can totally eliminate the free-riding problem and thus allows for an e¢ cient
yet private provision of public goods. This is already a big advantage compared to
alternative mechanisms proposed by the literature, as for example the xed-prize
lotteries proposed by Morgan (2000).
On top of the e¢ ciency consideration, the mechanism presents some other desir-
able features that make it more appealing than competing mechanisms.
For example, it is an horizontally-equitable mechanism. That is, the subsidy
received is the same for all those players that contribute the same amount. Further,
it can be seen as both a horizontally and vertically equitable mechanism since the
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subsidy rate is the same for every player. This is a feature shared with Morgan
(2000)s xed-prize lottery. The latter is, however, regressive (i.e., the fraction of
income spent on lottery tickets decreases with the income of the players), while the
hybrid lottery does not have to be it.
Another relevant feature is that the mechanism is self-nanced: it never runs
out of money, not even o¤-the-equilibrium path. This apparently minor point is not
minor at all: it is one of the basic constraints present in the standard VCM (the one
that demands contributions to be non-negative for each player) and is violated by
several mechanisms including Morgan (2000)s lotteries as well as all-pay auctions. It
is really not a surprise that the outcome is then superior to that of the VCMs. On the
other hand, the hybrid lottery though bound by this constraintalso outperforms
the standard VCM, does better than the xed-prize lottery, and does as well as the
all-pay auction.
Methodologically, the mechanism can be made dominance-solvable. That is,
the subsidy function can be chosen such that all players have a dominant strategy.
This is a relevant result as it means that the cognitive load demanded from players
to solve the game is minimal, making it a simple game that anyone can understand
and solve. In particular, the mechanism is less cognitive-demanding than alternative
mechanisms that rely on the Nash equilibrium concept, such as the provision point
mechanisms (eg, Andreoni (1998)) or those that consist of two-stages (eg, Moore and
Repullo (1988)). Further, in some cases, the allocation implemented is the rst-best
one. This means that the e¢ cient outcome can be achieved without people having
to make complicated calculations.
Finally, and as a consequence especially of the last two features: self-su¢ ciency
and dominance-solvability, we claim that it would be very easy to implement the
hybrid lottery by real-world institutions such as charities that rely on voluntary
contributions. The self-su¢ ciency ensures that the mechanism does not need to be
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called out if not enough money is raised to nance the prizes, while the dominance-
solvability implies that people can easily understand the mechanism. If, on top of
its simplicity, the mechanism is also e¢ cient and equitable as mentioned above, we
claim hybridlotteries can be successfully used as means for nancing public goods by
charities and other real-world organisations that rely on voluntary contributions.
The paper is organized as follows. A linear version of the public good game with
homogeneous agents and complete information is formalized in section 2. Section
3 presents extensions and discusses the mechanism. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Proofs are left for the appendix.
2. LINEAR MODEL
2.1. Setup
In an economy there are N > 1 homogeneous individuals indexed by i 2 I :=
f1; :::; Ng and two goods: a private one x and a public one G. Each individual is
endowed with wealth wi = w > 0 8i 2 I that can be used to buy the private good and
to contribute to the provision of the public good.2 The individual budget constraint
is thus given by xi + gi  w, where gi  0 is player is contribution to the public
good measured in units of the private goodand the price of the private good is
normalised to 1. The public good is produced out of the private good according to
the production function G :=
PN
i=1 gi.
3 As usual, individuals can consume di¤erent
quantities of the private good (xi can be di¤erent from xj , for i 6= j) but everyone
consumes the same quantity of the public good (Gi = Gj = G 8i; j 2 I).
2The heterogeneous case is analysed in the Extensions section.
3Capital letters will be used throughout the paper to indicate aggregate (sociey-wide) variables,
while lowercase letters are used for individual variables.
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Agentspreferences are given by the linear utility function
u (xi; G) = xi + G (1)
where
 2

1
N
; 1

(2)
is known in the experimental literature as the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
and is, more generally, the marginal rate of substitution of good G for good x.4
2.1.1. First Best (FB) Benchmark
Societys preferences are assumed to be Utilitarian: ~U (x; G) :=
PN
i=1 u(xi; G),
where x is the private-consumption vector of the economy: x := (x1; :::; xN ). Then:
U (X;G) := X + NG. A benevolent social planner chooses X and G to maximise
social welfare, subject to, 8i 2 I:
xi  0 (3)
gi  0 (4)
xi + gi  w (5)
i.e., nonnegative private consumption, nonnegative contributions and budget con-
straint, respectively.
The e¢ cient, rst best solution is to set (xi ; g

i ) = (0; w) 8i 2 I, so that aggregate
consumption is (X; G) = (0;W ). The utility of agent i is thus ui = x

i+G
 = W .
Intuitively, the marginal social cost of contributing (i.e., the loss in utility due to
lower private consumption) isMSC = 1 and the marginal social benet of contribut-
ing (i.e., the gain in social welfare due to higher public consumption) isMSB = N.
4Alternative utility functions are considered in section 3, Extensions and discussion.
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Since (from equation 2) MSB = N > 1 = MSC, then the central planner has
incentives to increase contributions as much as possible. Thus, at the optimum each
player contributes her entire endowment, consumes 0 units of the private good and
W units of the public good.
2.1.2. Nash equilibrium (NE)
Each individual chooses xi and gi to maximise her utility (given by equation 1)
subject to her budget constraint and the nonnegativity conditions.
The solution is to set (xi ; g

i ) = (w; 0). This means that (X
; G) = (W; 0)
and that the utility of the agent is ui = x

i + G
 = w.
Intuitively, the marginal private cost of contributing is MPC = 1 and the mar-
ginal private benet is MPB = . Since (from equation 2) MPB =  < 1 =MPC,
then the agent has incentives to decrease contributions as much as possible. Thus,
in equilibrium each agent contributes 0, consumes w units of the private good and
0 units of the public good. In game-theoretical terms, contributing 0 is a strictly
dominant strategy : no matter what the other players do, it is always individually
optimal to contribute zero.
2.1.3. Comparison: FB v NE
The social optimum is not implemented by the decentralised, voluntary contri-
bution mechanism (V CM). This is so even though the NE is Pareto-dominated
by the FB allocation (using equation 2, ui = Nw > w = u

i 8i 2 I). The
discrepancy is the result of the di¤erent incentive schemes (social v individual incen-
tives): MPB 6= MSB because individuals overlook the positive e¤ect (externality)
of her contribution on the wellbeing of her fellow agents and thus contributions are
suboptimally low.
This is the well-known free-riding problem: the non-excludability of the public
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good implies that, once provided, everyone will enjoy it, regardless of whether one
contributed to its provision or not. Yet, contributions are costly in terms of (foregone)
private consumption, so players have incentives to keep their money and spend it
on private consumption rather than contributing it, hoping that others will and
so benetting from their contributions. But since every individual is expected to
reason in these terms, the end result is that the public good is under-provided as
compared to the FB allocation and in this setupfree-riding is extreme: each player
contributes zero when it would be optimal that each one of them contributed their
entire endowments.
Since the utility function is linear, we expect a corner solution. Thus, despite of
the fact that the players could in principlechoose any contribution gi 2 [0; w], for
all practical reasons we can restrict our attention to what happens when gi = 0 and
when gi = w and thus transform a continuous game into a discrete one. This is the
type of game used by Sanchez Villalba and Martinez Gorricho (2014). In this case,
the game can be interpreted as a Prisoners Dilemma in which the dominant strategy
is to deviate (contribute zero) and the social optimum is reached when everyone
cooperates (contributes everything).
2.2. Hybrid Lottery
2.2.1. Subsidy function
We redene the problem by introducing a new component: a subsidy or cash
rebate. Especically, we dene
gi := i   si := i   s (K)  i = [1  s (K)]i (6)
where i 2 [0; w] is player is gross contribution, si := s (K)i 2 [0; i] is the subsidy
(cash rebate) received by player i, s(K) 2 [0; 1] is the subsidy rate and K :=PNi=1 i
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is the aggregate (total) gross contribution.
The subsidy function must satisfy three conditions:
If i = 0 then si = 0 (7)
si  0 (8)
si  i always, so that 0  gi (9)
The rst one simply says that only contributors are entitled to subsidies. The
second one that the subsidy is not a tax. And the third one that the mechanism is
self-nancing : the designer always has enough money to pay the subsidies promised,
both on- and o¤-equilibrium.
The third condition, though quite straightforward and apparently self-evident,
is however violated by popular mechanisms suggested by the literature like lotteries
and auctions, in which the winner ends up paying a negative contributionto the
public good. Thus, these mechanisms enjoy an unfair advantage over the original
V CM model, and so it is not surprising that they fare better than the latter in
terms of e¢ ciency: by expanding the choice set (i.e., allowing for gi < 0) things
can only improve. We, on the other hand, retain the condition as presented in the
original V CM model and, thus, we believe that our comparisons are fair. Actually,
our method seems to do better than the V CM (in a fair comparison), but also better
than Morgans xed-prize and pari-mutual lotteries, and at least as good as auctions
in terms of promoting e¢ ciency.
The preferences of the consumers are thus given by
ui() = w   [1  s (K)]i +  [1  s (K)]K (10)
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2.2.2. Gross and net contributions
Thus, gi can now be interpreted as player is net contribution, such that the level
of the public good G is still given by the sum of individual net contributions: G :=PN
i=1 gi. The choice variable of the optimising player is now the gross contribution
i, and her net contribution depends not only on the players choice i but through
the subsidy si := s (K)  ion every players choices K.
2.2.3. Alternative interpretations
Lottery with an endogenous prize The subsidy function can be also interpreted
as the prize of a lottery similar to the ones presented in Morgan (2000), hence the
name of hybrid lotterieswe gave to our setting. In particular, it is like a lottery
in which those who buy tickets (those whose gross contributions are positive) get a
prize (the subsidy) that depends on the number of tickets bought (the amount grossly
contributed). Also, the prize per euro spent on tickets(or average subsidy rate),
si
i
, is the same for every contributor: sii =
s(K)i
i
= s (K), thus treating every
contributor equally (equality concern: if player i and j grossly contribute the same
amount i.e., i = jthen they receive the same subsidy i.e., si = sj).5 The total
prize/subsidy paid out to ticket-holders/contributors is, however, not a xed amount
like in Morgan, but one that changes with the level of aggregate gross contributions:
S :=
PN
i=1 si =
PN
i=1 [s (K)  i] = s (K) K. It is not, either, a pari-mutual lottery
in which the total prize is a constant fraction of the ticket sales, because the fraction
of the ticket sales that is allocated to the prize, SK , is a function of the amount of
tickets sold: SK = s (K). Thus, the total prize paid is endogenous, as it varies with
the level of aggregate gross contributions K and this variation is nonlinear in K, so
5Note, however, that di¤erent players could get di¤erent subsidies by grossly contributing dif-
ferent quantities, so that the equality here is not ex-post, but ex-ante. In other words, the method
ensures equality of opportunity, but allows for ex-post inequality based on the actions taken by the
players.
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that our lottery shares features of the two lotteries analysed by Morgan: it can be
interpreted as a nonlinear subsidy function (just like the xed-prize lotteries) and
the total prize paid changes with the level of aggregate gross contributions (like in
pari-mutual lotteries). Thus the hybridlottery of the title.
Third commodity Another interpretation (although related to the previous one)
consists in considering the existence of a third commodity in the model, which would
correspond to the variable i. This third commodity could be, for example, the
ticketsof the lottery and it has no intrinsic value except for their impact on the
size of the prize si and on the level of public good provision G. The implicit price of
the third commodity would therefore be p(K) := 1  s(K) and the net contribution
of player i would be given by the expression gi := p (K)i. This notation will be
very helpful to our analysis and so we will use both throughout the paper. The
main advantage of this notation is that the net contribution can be thought as the
expenditure on the third commodity and that changes on the net contribution can
be decomposed into rst-order, quantity e¤ects and second-order, price e¤ects. The
preferences of consumers under this interpretation can thus be written as ui() =
w   p (K)i +   p (K) K.
2.2.4. Marginal analysis
An agents problem consists in choosing her gross contribution i in order to
maximise her utility (equation 10) subject to her budget constraint (equation 5), the
nonnegativity constraints (equations 3 and 4) and the subidy constraints (equations
7, 8 and 9). The rst-order condition is thus:
@u
@i
=  MPC +MPB =  
h
1  s(K)

1  i
K
j"sK j
i
+  [1  s(K) (1  j"sK j)]
(11)
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where "sK :=
@s(K)
@K
K
s(K) is the elasticity of the subsidy rate s(K) with respect to the
aggregate level of gross contributions K. Note in particular that both the MPC and
the MPB are a¤ected by the introduction of the subsidy.
Comparison to Morgans lotteries The rst-order condition found above is gen-
eral enough as to encompass Morgans lotteries as special cases. In our setting, the
prizeis the total amount paid as subsidies to the individuals and is, thus, endoge-
nous: P (K) := s(K)K.
Voluntary contributions mechanisms (VCM) Morgan showed that the standard
V CM game can be interpreted as a zero-prize lottery: one in which s(K) = 0
8K 2 [0;W ] (so that P (K) = 0 8K). The FOC then becomes: @u@i =  1 +  < 0
and so the solution is like the one in section 2.1.2. The positive externality that ones
contribution has on every other individual leads to suboptimal contributions by all.
Fixed-prize lottery (FPL) Morgans best lottery is the one in which the prize is
xed: P (K) = P 8K, and thus s(K) := PK and j"sK j = 1. The FOC then becomes:
@u
@i
=   1  s(K)  1  iK  +  and we can see that this lottery is superior to the
V CM because it decreases the MPC, thus increasing the incentives to contribute.
Note, however, that the MPB is not a¤ected. The lottery introduces a negative
externality that partially mitigates the positive one (free-riding): when one player
buys an extra ticket, she decreases everybody elses chances of winning the prize.
Thus, people contribute more than in the V CM .
Pari-mutual lottery (PML) Morgan also explored pari-mutuallotteries in which
the prize is a xed proportion of the ticket sales (a very popular format) and found
that they are not better than the V CM . In PMLs, P (K) = c K, where c 2 (0; 1) is
a constant, and so s(K) := P (K)K =
cK
K = c. Thus, j"sK j = 0 and the FOC becomes:
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@u
@i
=   (1  c) +  (1  c) = (1  c) ( 1 + ) < 0. Thus, the solution is identical to
the V CM as Morgan suggested, because the PML does decrease the MPC but it
also decreases the MPB in the same proportion, so that the contribution decision is
not a¤ected by the lottery. In the terminology of externalities, the PML introduces
a negative externality like the FPL, but also a positive externality: when a player
buys an extra ticket, the prize is increased, thus benetting everyone. In this case,
these two externalities exactly o¤set each other and thus the outcome is identical to
the V CM one.
Hybrid Lottery The hybrid lottery shares features of the two polar cases analysed
by Morgan: it can be reinterpreted as a nonlinear subsidy that is a decreasing function
of the contributions (like the FPL) and its prize is not xed (as in the PML). This
exibility allows us to design hybrid lotteries that are more e¢ cient than the best
alternative (Morgans FPL). Further, if the subsidy rate function is appropriately
chosen, i = w can become a weakly dominant strategy. This is the goal of the
following section.
2.3. Mechanics of the mechanism
The goal of this section is to design a subsidy function such that full contribution
(i = w 8i 2 I) is a (weakly) dominant strategy and the level of net contributions is
e¢ cient.
Before we begin with the analysis, however, a couple of concepts need to be
dened.
Definition 1. An Iso-Public Line(IPL) is the set of all pairs (i;K i) such
that the level of aggregate gross contributions K is constant. Formally, it is the set
of all pairs (i;K i) such that i +K i = a, with a 2 [0;W ].
12
Corollary 1. The price of contributions p(K) := 1 s(K) is constant along an
iso-public line.
Corollary 2. Since the amount of public good is given by G := p (K)K, then
G is constant along an iso-public line.
Graphically, iso-public lines are straight lines given by the equation K i = a i,
a 2 [0;W ]. In gure 1 three iso-public lines are shown: the ones corresponding to
the lowest possible value of K (K = 0), to an intermediate value (K = w=) and to
the highest possible value (K = W ) (the downward, parallel lines that go through
the origin, the intermediate one and the one close to the upper-right corner of the
diagram, respectively).6
-20 -10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
100
200
300
k(i)
K(-i)
ABC
DE
FIG. 1
6Variable on x-axis: player is gross contribution i; variable on y-axis: aggregate contributions
of society, excluding player is gross contributions K i := K   i. Paremeters:  = 0:6, N = 4,
w = 100, Ai = 80, K
A
 i = 250 and  = 10.
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Definition 2. The Irrelevance Lineis the set of all pairs (i;K i) such that
the utility enjoyed by player i is the same for all possible values of the price of
contribution.
This occurs when K   i = 0, so that the utility of the player is ui = w
regardless of the value of the price of contributions (note that the utility function
can be written as ui() = w + p (K) (K   i), so that the price p(K) is irrelevant
when K   i = 0). Thus, along this line, the mechanism cannot do anything to
modify the situation of the player. Graphically, it is a ray that goes through the
origin, has slope 1  and takes the value
1 
 w when i = w (see gure 1).
Definition 3. The Lower (Upper) Regionis the area below (above) the irrel-
evance line. Formally, the set of pairs (i;K i) such that K   i < 0 (> 0).
Note that in the Lower Region, since p(K) 2 [0; 1], then the utility of the in-
dividual can be, at most, equal to w, which occurs only if contributions are free:
p(K) = 0. Analogously, in the Upper Region, the utility of the indiviual can be, at
least, equal to w, which occurs only if p(K) = 0.
2.4. Obtention of the price function
Proposition 1. If aggregate gross contributions are su¢ ciently low, then con-
tributions must be free. Formally, p(K) = 0 8K 2
h
0; w
i
.
Proof. On page 28 of the appendix.
Notice that a consequence of proposition 1 is that ui = w all over the area below
the K = w iso-public line.
Definition 4. The Upper-Right Region is the area above the K = w iso-
public line. Formally, it is the set of pairs (i;K i) such that i +K i  w .
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Since the upper-right regionis a subset of the upper region, it must be true
that the utility of the individual must be at least as high as w.
Proposition 2. Consider 5 pairs (i;K i): A :=
 
Ai ;K
A
 i

, B :=
 
Bi ;K
B
 i

,
C =:
 
Ci ;K
C
 i

, D :=
 
Di ;K
D
 i

and E :=
 
Ei ;K
E
 i

, such that all of them belong
to the upper-right region and Bi = 
A
i   , Ci = Bi   , Di = Ai , Ei = Bi ,
KB i = K
A
 i, K
C
 i = K
A
 i, K
D
 i = K
A
 i    and KE i = KD i, with  > 0. Then:
If (1) uAi > u
B
i and (2) u
D
i > u
E
i , then u
A
i > u
C
i .
Proof On page 29 in the appendix.
Graphically, the 5 pairs are located as shown in gure 1 and are such that B and
D belong to the same iso-public line (KB = KD), as do C and E (KC = KE). If
we consider that the gross contribution i is a discrete variable, then the parameter
 can be interpreted as the di¤erence between two consecutive levels of contribution.
The continuous case is obtained by simply assuming that  ! 0.
The proposition can be interpreted as a sort of transitivityfeature, so that the
following corollary can be stated:
Corollary 3. If u (w;K i) > u (w   ;K i) 8K i 2

1 
 w;W i
i
, then
u (w;K i) > u (i;K i) 8K i 2

1 
 w;W i
i
; i 2 [0; w)
Proof. Follows directly from the repeated application of proposition 2.
This corollary implies that if full contribution i = w is better than the immedi-
ately inferior level of contribution i = w   , then full contribution is a dominant
strategy. Thus, to achieve our goal of ensuring that full contribution is a weak domi-
nant strategy of the game it is enough to design a price (subsidy rate) function p(K)
(s(K)) such that the utility of full contribution is weakly greater than the utility of
contributing w   .
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2.4.1. Weak dominance
Remark 1. There are innite price (subsidy rate) functions that satisfy the con-
ditions of corollary 3.
Table 1 shows an example of one of those price functions that makes full contri-
butions a weakly dominant strategy.7
K i
300 200 100 0
i 100 45 + 132 = 177 60 + 72 = 132 75 + 30 = 105 100 + 0 = 100
0 100 + 72 = 172 100 + 30 = 130 100 + 0 = 100 100 + 0 = 100
TABLE 1
Dominance-solvable game
Game-theoretically, the price function can transform the PrisonersDilemma of
the original V CM into a Stag Hunt with Pareto-ranked equilibria and, even, into a
game in which full contribution is the (weakly) dominant strategy.
2.4.2. First Best implementation
Furthermore, a subset of those price functions can implement the rst best out-
come by simply setting p(W ) = 1. That is, if everyone grossly contributes their
entire wealth (so i = w 8i 2 I) then everyone net contributes their entire wealth:
gi := p(K)i = p(W )w = w 8i 2 I, and the level of public good produced is e¢ cient,
G := p(K)K = W . And since full contribution is a weakly dominant strategy, the
rst best outcome can be implemented.
Proposition 3. The rst best outcome can be implemented by price functions
that ensure that full contribution is a weakly dominant strategy.
7Cell values indicate the utility of the row player, broken down into its two contituent terms, as
in equation 1. Parameter values: w = 100; N = 4;  = 0:6;  = 100:Price function: p(400) = 0:55;
p(300) = 0:40; p(200) = 0:25; p(100) = 0
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Proof. Impose p(W ) = 1 and, based on this, work out a price function that
ensures the weak dominance of full contributions.
Therefore, there are innite ways to implement the FB and making full contribu-
tion the weak dominant strategy. Table 2 shows an example.8
K i
300 200 100 0
i 100 0 + 240 = 240 50 + 90 = 140 75 + 30 = 105 100 + 0 = 100
0 100 + 90 = 190 100 + 30 = 130 100 + 0 = 100 100 + 0 = 100
TABLE 2
Dominance-solvable, e¢ cient game
It is important to notice that, since dominance of full contributions is only weak
and not strict, the implementation of the rst best cannot be ensured. However,
there is a good case for believing that it will, based on empirical and experimental
evidence (Sanchez Villalba and Martinez Gorricho (2014), among others).
2.4.3. Top 2 (T2) method
One reasonable way of implementing the FB outcome and ensuring that full
contribution is a weakly dominant strategy would consist in nding a price function
that, on top of satisfying the conditions of corollary 3 and that p(W ) = 1, maximise
the level of utility (public good provision) for each possible level of K i (for each
column of a table, as in examples in tables 1 and 2). The designers problem is thus
max
fp(w+K i)g
u (w;K i) subject to
u (w   ;K i + )  u (w;K i + ) 8K i 2

1  

w;W i

(12)
8Cell values indicate the utility of the row player, broken down into its two contituent terms, as
in equation 1. Parameter values: w = 100; N = 4;  = 0:6;  = 100:Price function: p(400) = 1;
p(300) = 0:50; p(200) = 0:25; p(100) = 0:
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and the process of nding the price function is an iterative one: it starts with the
highest possible value that K can take, K =W (when p(W ) = 1), and then consid-
ers subsequently lower levels: K = W   , K = W   2, etc. up to K = w . Note
that pairs (w;K i) and (w   ;K i + ) belong to the same iso-public line (K =
w+K i) and so u (w;K i) and u (w   ;K i + ) are functions of price p (w +K i),
while pair (w;K i + ) belongs to a higher iso-public line (K = w + K i + )
and so u (w;K i + ) is the function of price p (w +K i + ). Since the process
is iterative, the latter price p (w +K i + ) was determined in a previous iter-
ation, and so is the utility u (w;K i + ). Notice also that u (w;K i) = w +
p (w +K i) [ (w +K i)  w] and u (w   ;K i + ) = w+p (w +K i) [ (w +K i)  (w   )]
are linear, increasing functions of the choice variable p (w +K i),9 so that higher
prices both increase the objective function and makes the constraint more likely
to be violated. Thus, the constrained solution can only be either p (w +K i) =
1 if the constraint is not binding or p (w +K i) such that u (w   ;K i + ) =
u (w;K i + ) if the constraint is binding. Now, the constraint can be re-written as
p (w +K i)  a (K i; w; ; )p (w +K i + ) where a (;w;K i) := (w+K i+) w(w+K i) (w )
is a positive constant that satises that a (K i; w; ; ) < 1 8K i 2

1 
 w;W i
i
.
Thus, the constraint is binding and the solution is
p (w +K i) = a (K i; w; ; )  p (w +K i + ) 8K i 2

1  

w;W i

(13)
so that we can obtain the price function in an iterative way, knowing that p(W ) = 1
and working out the rest using equation 13.
Proposition 4. The price function p(K) is a strictly increasing function of ag-
gregate gross contribution K; in the range K 2

1
w;W
i
.
9This is so because both (w;K i) and (w   ;K i + ) belong to the upper-right regionand
thus the expressions in brackets in the second terms of both utilities are positively signed.
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Proof. It follows directly from equation 13.
Proposition 5. Contributions are free for low values (i.e., p(K) = 0 is constant
for K 2
h
0; 1w
i
) and they become more expensive as contributions increase (for
K 2

1
w;W
i
), reaching a maximum when K =W : p(W ) = 1.
Proof. It follows directly from propositions 1, 4 and 3.
Notice that equation 13 indicates that the relationship between two consecutive
values of the price function is an exact one, meaning that we get a unique price
function when we use the Top 2method. Further, since the constraint is binding
it must be the case that u (w   ;K i + ) = u (w;K i + ) 8K i 2

1 
 w;W i
i
,
which means that the utility of the top two possible levels of individual gross
contributions (w and w   ) must yield the same level of utility (hence the name of
the method).
Continuous case The continuous case can be obtained by considering the lim-
iting case when  ! 0. The constraint thus becomes @ui@i (i = w;K i) = 0
8K i 2

1 
 w;W i
i
. In this setup we can obtain an explicit solution to the prob-
lem, which is given by
p(K) =
8><>:
0 if 0  K  w
K w
W w
 1 

if w  K  W
(14)
and satises the conditions of proposition 5. Graphically:10
10Parameters:  = 0:6, w = 100, W = 400.
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Table 3 shows an example of how the T2 method operates.11
K i
300 275 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0
100 240 216 194 173 155 139 125 114 105 101 100 100 100
75 239 215 193 172 154 138 124 112 103 100 100 100 100
i 50 236 212 190 169 150 134 119 106 100 100 100 100 100
25 231 207 184 163 144 126 109 100 100 100 100 100 100
0 224 199 176 154 133 111 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TABLE 3
"Top 2" Method, e¢ cient game
3. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Heterogeneity
3.1.1. Income heterogeneity
Equation 2 becomes  2  wiW ; 1 8i 2 I (note that the homogeneous case is ob-
tained if wi = w 8i 2 I). This equation ensures that the full contribution allocation
(FCA, in which every person gets utility ui = W ) Pareto-dominates the zero con-
tribution allocation (ZCA, in which subjects get utility ui = wi) or, in other words,
11Cell values indicate the utility of the row player. Parameter values: w = 100; N = 4;  = 0:6;
 ! 0:Price function: p(K) =
8><>:
0 if 0  K  1003
5
3
5
K 100
3
5
400 100
 1  35
3
5 =

3K 500
700
 2
3 if 1003
5
 K  400
20
that every player prefers the FCA to the ZCA. Notice that if the richest person
(with income wH) prefers the FCA to the ZCA, then everyone else will also prefer
the former to the latter. Thus, we can focus on the richest person and all our re-
sults hold if we substitute the highest income wH for the average income w in our
equations.
3.1.2. Heterogeneity in preferences
Equation 2 becomes i 2
 
1
N ; 1
 8i 2 I (note that the homogeneous case is
obtained if i =  8i 2 I). As in the previous case, this equation ensures that
the full contribution allocation (FCA, in which every person gets utility ui = iW )
Pareto-dominates the zero contribution allocation (ZCA, in which subjects get utility
ui = w). Analogously, if the most public-averseperson (with the lowest value of
gamma, L) prefers the FCA to the ZCA, then everyone else will also prefer the
former to the latter. Thus, we can focus on the most public-averseperson and all
our results hold if we substitute the lowest gamma L for the average gamma  in
our equations.
3.1.3. Heterogeneity in income and in preferences
Equation 2 becomes i 2
 
wi
W ; 1
 8i 2 I (note that the homogeneous case is
obtained if i =  and wi = w 8i 2 I). As before, it ensures that the full contribution
allocation (FCA, in which every person gets utility ui = iW ) Pareto-dominates the
zero contribution allocation (ZCA, in which subjects get utility ui = wi). In this
setup the typeof a player can be summarised by the ratio  i =
i
wi
and so if the
person with the lowest type L prefers the FCA to the ZCA, then everyone else will
also prefer the former to the latter. Thus, we can focus on the lowest-typeperson
and all our results hold if we substitute the lowest-typegamma and income for the
average gamma and average income in our equations.
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3.2. Imperfect information
If the type of the players is not known, and because of the results of the previous
three subsections, it can be seen that the designer does not need to know much about
the distribution of types (only the highestor lowestvalue of the distribution) in
order to nd the price function. Thus, using conservative estimates of the extreme
values of the distribution of types would almost ensure the implementation of the
rst-best outcome in a (weak) dominance game.
3.3. Replicability of the population
It is straightforward to show that the results of propositions 3 and 5 hold when
the population is replicated (e.g., doubled or halved), although the price function
can be di¤erent from one case to the other.
3.4. Equity considerations
The mechanism is equitative in the sense that each euro contributed is treated
equally (i.e., the subsidy rate/price is the same for everyone), although the total
subsidy received (the total amount of money spent on the third commodity) could
di¤er from one person to the next. Thus, the mechanism is closer to the idea of
equality of opportunity: each euro contributed is treated equally, but people can
obtain di¤erent outcomes by choosing di¤erent levels of contribution (just like each
visit to a doctor might be equally priced for everyone, but di¤erent people could pay
a di¤erent number of visits). Ex-post equality is not expected to arise but in special
circumstances (like in the homogeneous case).
Sanchez Villalba and Martinez Gorricho (2014) consider alternative scenarios in
which the price/subsidy rate can di¤er across players by introducing variability in
the payments via a lottery. They also explore the e¤ect of risk on the contribution
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decisions of experimental subjects (the link between risk and inequality being well
known since Harsanyi (1955)) and nd that the equitable mechanism (the hybrid
lottery) yields better results than the inequitable and/or risky ones.
3.5. Non-unanimous societies
When some (one or more) players prefer the Zero Contribution Allocation (ZCA)
to the Full Contribution one (FCA) then the hybrid lottery needs to be modied.
This occurs when i <
wi
W for at least one player, so that the utility of said player if
nobody contributes (ui = wi) is greater than her utility when everybody contributes
(ui = iW ). This means that there is no unanimity regarding the ranking of FCA
and ZCA (i.e., FCA and ZCA are not Pareto-ranked): some players (loners)
prefer the ZCA, others (socials) prefer the FCA. It is therefore impossible for
lonersto be convinced to contribute their entire wealth: even in the best scenario,
the most they could get out of it would be a utility equal to ui = iW , which is
lower than the one they would get if they kept all their income for themselves.
It is possible, however, to provide incentives for loners to contribute part of their
wealth: intuitively, the price function should be chosen such that the loners loss
due to lower private consumption is (more than) compensated by the increase in
public consumption. Table 4 shows an example of how this can be done.12 The
price function becomes a step function that only takes extreme values (0 or 1) but
the game is not as simple as in the unanimous society case (USC): at rst sight,
it is not straightforward to see that all players have a (weakly) dominant strategy,
although they do. It is easy to realise that the rich player has a weakly dominant
12Parameter values: N = 4, 3 poorplayers with wealth wp = 50 each, and 1 richplayer with
wealth wr = 250. Cell values indicate the utility of the row player: the left/right table (A/B) shows
the utility of the/one of the rich/poor player/s.  = 10. Price function:
p(K) =

0 if K 2 f0; :::; 360g
1 if K 2 f360; :::; 400g (15)
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strategy, namely playing r = 220, but the poor players case is not self-evident.
The poor players can, however, realise that the rich player will play r = 220, and
thus can deduct that K pi can take values between 220 (if the other poor players
contribute nothing) and 320 (if the other poor players contribute all their wealth).
The latter upper bound is important because it implies that the poor player can
ignore the rst four columns of her table and that contributing 50 is a dominant
strategy in the reduced tableresulting from ignoring the rst four columns. That
is, rich and poor players have a weakly dominant strategy (220 and 50, respectively),
but unlike the unanimous societycase, nding them requires the iterated deletion
of weakly dominated strategies (IDWDS). This is more demanding for the players
than the simple comparison of columnspayo¤s required in the USC, and it might
generate a suboptimal outcome due to cognitive limitations (Sanchez Villalba (2010)
shows that quite a signicant number of people do not do even the second iteration).
Also, technically, the IDWDS can be criticised by the fact that the actual path of
iterations followed can a¤ect the nal outcome. But there seems to be evidence that
shows that people might treat weakly and strictly dominated strategies as equivalent
(Sanchez Villalba and Martinez Gorricho (2014)). Finally, the allocation arrived
with this method is very close to the First-Best outcome (in the example in table
4, it corresponds to r = 225 and 

pi = 50) but it might depend crucially on the
discreteness of the model (i.e., of  being nite and positive, the graininess of
contributions). One of the avenues of research that we plan to follow consists on
analysing this case in detail.
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A K r B K pi
Rich 1 5 0 1 4 0 1 3 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 . . . 0 Poor 3 5 0 3 4 0 3 3 0 3 2 0 3 1 0 . . 0
2 5 0 2 4 0 2 3 4 2 2 8 2 2 2 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 5 0 2 4 0 2 3 4 2 2 8 2 2 2 5 0 5 0 5 0
2 4 0 2 4 4 2 3 8 2 3 2 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 4 0 2 4 4 2 3 8 2 3 2 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
r 2 3 0 2 4 8 2 4 2 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 pi 3 0 2 4 8 2 4 2 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
2 2 0 2 5 2 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 0 2 5 2 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
2 1 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 1 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
. . . 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5 0
TABLE 4
Non-unanimous society
3.6. Other utility functions
The basic intuitions of the linear model can be extended to quasi-linear and non-
linear models, although the technical details are di¤erent. This is, at least, the result
that we have reached so far in our investigations with alternative utility functions. In
particular, the Top 2method seems to be robust (with some minor modications),
so we believe that the linear results are likely to be extrapolated to the nonlinear
cases. This is the other fundamental avenue of research that we intend to follow
in the immediate future. Just as an illustration, table 5 shows an example of the
application of the method to a quasi-linear utility function.13
13Parameter values: ui = xi + v(G), where v(G) =   13200G2 + 38G. N = 4 players. wi = 1008i 2 I:  = 10:
25
K i
3 0 0 2 9 0 2 8 0 2 7 0 2 6 0 2 5 0 2 4 0 2 3 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 9 0 1 8 0 ... 0
1 0 0 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 7 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
9 0 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 7 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
8 0 1 1 2 1 0 9 1 0 7 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
7 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 1 0 6 1 0 5 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
i 6 0 1 1 0 1 0 7 1 0 6 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 8 1 0 6 1 0 5 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 1 0 7 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
3 0 1 0 6 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
2 0 1 0 5 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 4 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
TABLE 5
Quasilinear utility function
4. CONCLUSIONS
The private provision of public goods is one of the fundamental topics in Public
Economics and has ample application to many real-world situations. Indeed, the
presence of public goods is one of the sources of market failure: when left alone,
the private market will provide an ine¢ ciently low level of provision of public goods.
Examples of this problem can be found in many scenarios, from the low level of
charity giving in a society or of foreign aid among states, to the low e¤ort exerted
by workers when paid according to the teams output, to the under-investment in
private vigilance in a neighborhood, to many others.
The underlying problem behind all of this situations is always the same: the
clash between social and individual objectives: while the socially optimal action is
to contribute, the individually optimal action is to free-ride. Several studies have
considered di¤erent alternative methods designed with the objective of eliminating
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(or at least mitigating) the ine¢ ciency associated with the private provision of public
goods. From pricing strategies (Lindahl (1958)), to truth-telling mechanisms (Groves
and Ledyard (1977)), to alternative settings (provision points, money-back guaran-
tees, lotteries à la Morgan (2000)), to a long list of etceteras.
The mechanism we propose in this paper is based on the same idea than Mor-
gan (2000)s paper, namely, introducing a negative externality among the individuals
that (partially) o¤sets the positive externality present in the voluntary contribution
mechanism. We propose that contributors should get a subsidysuch that the aver-
age subsidy rate is a non-linear, decreasing function of aggregate contributions. This
decreases the gap between the marginal benet and the marginal cost of contribu-
tion (as compared to the standard VCM), and thus provides incentives for players to
contribute more.
Our mechanism is based on voluntary contributions and improves the performance
of the best alternative in terms of aggregate contributions and yet it is simple (easy
to implement and understand), cheap and self-nanced (it is never needed to pour
money into it from other sources). Furthermore, it can even generate an equitable
outcome by paying the same subsidy rate to everyone.
In summary, we designed a mechanism that is better than the alternative methods
suggested in the literature: it produces a larger amount of public good (which is the
e¢ cient action to undertake in this setting) than alternative mechanisms, it is simple
to understand by the potential contributors and it is easy and cheap to implement
by the fundraiser (with special stress on the fact that it is an entirely self-nanced
mechanism). On top of that, rst-best provision in terms of contributions is feasible
under some conditions.
Also, the mechanism seems to be robust to the introduction of heterogeneity (say,
in terms of income or preferences) and of more general utility functions.
Finally, we consider that due to its characteristics previously described the
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hybrid lottery can be an e¤ective mechanism to nance the provision of public goods,
especially for charities and other real-world organisations that rely on voluntary
contributions for their operation.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proposition 1 The proof can be done in two steps:
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(1) p(K) = 0 8K 2
h
1 
 w;
1
w
i
: We know that the utility from pairs (i;K i)
belonging to the upper region is greater than or equal to w. In particular,
when K i = 1  w then u

i;
1 
 w

= w + p(K)
h


i +
1 
 w

  i
i
 w
8i 2 [0; w]. Weak dominance of full contribution requires u

w; 1  w


u

i;
1 
 w

8i 2 [0; w], which is only possible if u

i;
1 
 w

= w 8i 2
[0; w], which in turn is only possible if p

i +
1 
 w

= 0 8i 2 [0; w]. Adding
K i = 1  w to the range of i, the latter expression can be re-written as
p(K) = 0 8K 2
h
1 
 w;
1
w
i
.
(2) p(K) = 0 8K 2
h
0; 1  w
i
: Consider now the case in which i = 0 and
K i 2
h
0; 1  w
i
, which belongs to the upper regionas well, so u (0;K i) 
w 8K i 2
h
0; 1  w
i
. Weak dominance now requires, as a special case, that
u (w;K i)  u (0;K i) 8K i 2
h
0; 1  w
i
, which can only occur if p(0+K i) =
0 8K i 2
h
0; 1  w
i
. Since K = K i + i = K i in this case, the latter
expression becomes p(K) = 0 8K 2
h
0; 1  w
i
.
Combining the result of both steps, we obtain the result of proposition 1.
Proposition 2
(1) From the assumption that uDi > u
E
i then w + p(K
D)
 
KD   Di

> w +
p(KE)
 
KE   Ei

and, after some algebraic manipulation, p
 
KE

< p
 
KD

.
(2) Notice that uDi can be re-written as u
D
i = u
B
i   p(KB) and uEi as uEi =
uCi   p(KC), so uDi > uEi implies that uBi   uCi >

p(KD)  p(KE) .
(3) From (1) and (2) we get that uBi > u
C
i .
(4) From the assumption that uAi > u
B
i and (3) we get that u
A
i > u
C
i .
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